Consistent decisions are intuitively desirable and theoretically important for utility 21 maximization. Neuroeconomics has established the neurobiological substrate of value 22
in this previous research, we included a pairwise judgment (rather than preference) task as a 102 control, presenting respondents with pairs of numbers and asking them to judge which of the 103 two is larger. This protocol is similar to that used to establish the necessary role of the vmPFC 104 in value-related decisions (Fellows & Farah, 2007) . Thus, selective differences in patients 105
with MTL damage in value-based choices compared to numerical decisions should provide 106 strong evidence for the involvement of the hippocampus, and thereby mnemonic processes, in 107 value-based decision-making. 108
Methods

109
The study was approved by the local ethics committee of the University of Bonn and the 110
Institutional Review Board at Columbia University (IRB-AAAB1301) and all subjects gave 111 their written informed consent. control task, subjects were presented with pairs of numbers, drawn from the range of one to 131 twenty, and had to judge which number was larger. We computed judgment inconsistency 132 across triplets of comparison identically for the two tasks. Subjects knew that they would 133 receive their candy bar of choice from one randomly selected choice trial, in addition to a 134 participation fee of 10 €. 135
Our focal dependent measure was the proportion of intransitive choices. A triplet is 136 intransitive if (i) A was chosen over B and B was chosen over C, yet C was chosen over A or 137
(ii) if B was chosen over A and C was chosen over B, yet A was chosen over C. (Fig 1. E.g. A  138 can be Rolo, B, Bounty and C, Mars as described in the Introduction). We can test several alternative explanations to our account of random error in value 225 construction for our data. One alternative explanation is that respondents retain explicit 226 episodic memory of previous value comparisons during the task, and do not perform value 227 construction for the two options of each pairwise choice. Under this account, non-MTL 228 respondents may have better memory for their choices made earlier in the task, and this better 229 episodic memory prevents intransitive choices. This account would suggest that the rate of 230 intransitivities declines over time, as previous choices are remembered and used to avoid 231 intransitive later choices. We might expect this decline in intransitivities over choice trials 232 would differ for the MTL and non-MTL groups. We tested this hypothesis by regressing 233 whether or not a triplet was intransitive on the trial number of the last seen trial in that triplet. 234
We found no increase in the probability of a triplet being intransitive depending on when the 235 subjects saw the last trial in that triplet (b = 0.027, z = 0.79, p = 0.427) nor was this trend 236 different for the MTL group (b = 0.032, z = -0.78, p = 0.434). 237
An account emphasizing episodic memories of previous choices during the task makes a 238 more specific hypothesis: It would predict that the probability of instransitivity depends on the 239 delay (number of trials) between the choices involving the items that define 240 an intransitive triplet. To test this we checked whether a triplet was more likely to beintransitive depending on the variance in the trial numbers involved in that triplet. We found 242 that the further apart from each other the three choices in a triplet were made the more likely 243 they were to be intransitive (b = 0.109, z = 3.40, p = 0.007). Crucially, however, this pattern 244
was not different for the MTL group (b = -0.049, z = 1.25, p = 0.213). That is, the group 245 differences in intransivity cannot be explained by impairments of episodic memories during 246 the task. 247
Another alternative explanation involves group differences in speed-accuracy tradeoff. To 248 test this, we examined response latencies of the choices, and the relationship between 249 responses latencies and intransitivities for MTL and non-MTL groups. Contrary to a speed-250 accuracy tradeoff, we found that slower (rather than faster) trials were more likely to be 251 Notably both the speed accuracy tradeoff and the effect of the trial number of the last trial 259 in a triplet on intransitivity is the same for the numbers task as it is for the choice task, 260
suggesting that the two tasks share some similarities. Finally, we examined whether there 261 were any idiosyncratic effects on preference intransitivity associated with specific stimuli 262 (candy bars). We found no significant differences in the average number of intransitive 263 triplets each candy bar was involved in (F(1, 90) 
